center-Right camp (bürgerliche Lager), and further into a five-party system where a new challenger, the Left Party, has established itself to the left of the Greens-who themselves are suddenly coalescing (at least at Land level) with their once arch enemy, the CDU. This development has been well covered in earlier issues of this journal. 3 Yet, only now after four years of a grand coalition between the CDU and the SPD; only as policy making essentially has come to a halt and the campaign for the federal elections on 27 September 2009 has gained momentum, can we undertake a first assessment of the extent to which the political parties in Germany have adapted to the new game of five-party competition. To what extent have they been able to devise strategies for the condition of fluidity? To what extent have they learnt to swim?
2009 is another super election year (Superwahljahr). It was launched with the Land election in Hesse (18 January) where following the earlier election of January 2008 the SPD in particular had failed to form a viable new government. On 23 May, the Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung) will elect a new federal president or, more likely, will re-elect the current incumbent, Horst Köhler, to a second and final term. On 7 June, voters will be called to the polls for the European Parliament and local elections will be held in eight different Länder. At the end of August Land elections will follow in Saxony, a stronghold of the right wing extremist National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), and in Thuringia and the Saarland, both of which may see the formation of government coalitions between the SPD and the Left Party. On 27 September, finally, the Land election in Brandenburg and the federal election will follow. Although there is a good chance that Germany will continue to be governed by a two-party coalition, it is also thoroughly possible that Germany's political parties will have to venture into hitherto unchartered territory and form a three-party coalition.
Following the 2005 election, the formation of the grand coalition was a last resort rather than a preferred choice. That said, throughout August and September of that year, the electorate actually had been fairly positive about the prospect of closer cooperation between the two major parties. Surveys by Infratest dimap had shown that only 37 percent of the German electorate thought the CDU would be better equipped than the SPD to resolve the country's most important problems, and well below 30 percent were in favor of a CDU/FDP coalition. A grand coalition, in contrast, was the government constellation favored by the largest proportion of the electorate (between 35 and 39 percent), 4 not least because there was hope that after Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's controversial Agenda 2010 reforms a more consensual style of government would help to appease social conflicts and be more effective in addressing the most urgent political problems. For the Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party, however, a grand coalition was highly undesirable. For them, a coalition with the Free Democrats would have been the much preferred option, yet there was no majority for this constellation (see Table 1 ). Electoral arithmetic would have allowed for a three-party coalition with the FDP and Alliance 90/The Greens. This possibility was explored briefly, yet, at the time, the Greens in particular were averse to this experiment. Their performance in the out-going government and especially their support for Schröder's reforms to social and unemployment benefits (Hartz IV) had alienated many of their members and supporters. Entering a coalition with the CDU and the market liberal FDP would have completely destroyed their credibility.
Table 1: Results of Previous Bundestag Elections
Thus, the CDU resorted to the democratically undesirable option of entering a coalition with the Social Democrats. Contrary to the hope that the two large parties might jointly and in a more consensual style of policy making make significant headway with the reform agenda, the grand coalition has been remarkably inactive in the policy arena. Concerns by the opposition that the government's overwhelming majority in both Bundestag and Bundesrat might be used to implement major reforms to Germany's social market economy and for reorganizing the relationship between federal and Länder politics did not come true, even though the grand coalition would indeed have provided a unique opportunity. After all, especially against the background of Tony Blair's apparently very successful New Labour government in the UK, Germany's commitment to the principles of social justice, its style of corporatist consensualism, and its federal structure-often leading to opposite majorities in the two chambers of parliament-had been castigated widely as major obstacles to efficient policy making and a prime cause of Germany's perpetual problem of reform gridlock (Reformstau). 5 Yet, as the economy was picking up (see Figure 1) and unemployment figures were going down (see Table 2 ), the reform enthusiasm of the CDU, quickly evaporated. Placing the emphasis on the level of international and European politics, Angela Merkel provided little leadership domestically and presided over a coalition with virtual policy standstill-until the crisis in the financial markets and the emerging economic recession in 2008 catapulted her government into frantic attempts to stabilize the economy. Still, throughout the legislative period, Germany's first female chancellor enjoyed considerable public popularity and support. In national opinion polls, her party remained relatively stable, hovering around the election result of 2005. On various occasions, the ratings actually crossedat least for short spells-the 40 percent line. The SPD's ratings, by contrast, declined in the first quarter of 2006 below the 30 percent mark and never really recovered for any extended period of time. 6 Indeed, in a number of opinion polls the party came dangerously close to the 20 percent line. While the first grand coalition from 1966 to 1969 had considerably strengthened the SPD, making it acceptable to large parts of the electorate, and giving progressive and emancipatory reform politics a major boost, the second grand coalition gave an entirely different picture. Back in the 1960s, the first grand coalition had coincided with the beginnings of the postmaterialist value change that Ronald Inglehart later described as the "silent revolution. grand coalition, in contrast, saw the SPD in a structural crisis that is much more than a short term problem. Moreover, the legislative term ends in a mood of widespread anxiety, not only because in the economic recession unemployment figures are once again going up (see Table 2 ), but also because progressive politics seems to have lost its orientation. The emancipatory project somehow appears strangely exhausted. Politics has become defensive, and conditions of uncertainty-globalization, climate change, economic and social unsustainability, accelerated innovation, and changetrigger a host of security reflexes. Quite predictably, the grand coalition has benefited the smaller parties. In Land elections and national opinion polls, the Greens, the Left Party and the FDP all have increased their share of the vote and enhanced their significance in the coalition game. For the time being, the much debated scenario of three-party coalitions has not materialized. None of the Land elections held since 2005 has resulted in such a coalition, and it may well be that after the federal elections in September, Germany once again will be governed by a two-party coalition. But there are three factors pointing towards fundamental change in the German party system: 1) the lasting crisis of the Social Democratic Party implies that when trying to form a center-Left coalition, the SPD will need more than one coalition partner; 2) the Land elections held since 2005 provide evidence that the Left Party is not just a short-term phenomenon, but seems to have established itself, at least for the foreseeable future, as a sizeable small party which cannot be marginalized on permanent basis; and 3) with the Greens having entered a coalition with the CDU in Hamburg, and the Social Democrats coalescing with the Left Party in Berlin's Land government, more or less all party combinations now seem to be possible.
In terms of strategy making, this fragmentation of the party system represents a considerable challenge for all parties-further aggravated by the fact that constellations are different in all Länder and that with sixteen federal states, the next Land elections are never far away. Germany's political parties are caught in the dilemma that, on the one hand, strategic behavior is becoming more important than ever, while on the other, conditions of liquidity render such strategic planning ever more difficult. Voters expect clear policy statements and coalition commitments, even though developments are becoming more unpredictable and electoral behavior is increasingly incalculable. Thus, parties are badly advised to make clear commitments. In conditions of liquidity, the different dimensions of party strategy-policy seeking, office seeking, vote seeking, and inner party democracy seeking 8 -are becoming ever more difficult to reconcile. Unsurprisingly therefore, the parties have so far remained extremely cautious as regards committing themselves to any particular coalition scenar ios. In coalition politics-just as in late modern life politics in generalnoncommitment and keeping all options open are core principles of the condition of liquidity.
The origins of this pre-election special issue go back to a conference, co-sponsored by the Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, 9 that was held at the University of Bath in Autumn 2008. Since then, a number of experts who were not at this conference have joined the roster. In the first article, Udo Zolleis discusses the CDU's reorientation as the pragmatic "party of the center ground." Zolleis shows how in the past four years, the CDU has placed the emphasis on reducing political tensions with possible coalition partners and has pursued a strategy of vote seeking and office (coalition) seeking at the expense of the policyseeking dimension. The CDU, he argues, has become less conservative, less focused on economic policy, and more concerned about issues of social policy, thus opening space for the FDP to strengthen its own market-liberal profile. Next, Christoph Egle provides a detailed analysis of the SPD's electoral decline since the 2005 federal election. Based on the conceptual distinction between different dimensions of strategy formation, he analyzes the long-standing leadership crisis, the programmatic disorientation especially after Schröder's controversial Agenda 2010 reforms, and the SPD's uncoordinated handling of the challenge from the Left Party.
Ingolfur Blühdorn shows how Alliance 90/The Greens have placed their strategic emphasis on programmatic renewal and reconnecting to their membership. Suggesting that the Greens, despite having widened their policy profile, are still primarily regarded as the eco-party, Blühdorn focuses on the environmental policy dimension, and argues that the Greens have developed an eco-political position that is out of synch with mainstream environmentalism as represented by the popular Life of Health and Sustainability (LOHAS) movement. Rolf Steltemeier then explores how the FDP has moved from being a liberal party in the traditional sense to a market-liberal party, picking up disappointed voters from the CDU. He suggests, however, that in order to maximize their electoral potential and pave the way for a potential traffic light coalition, the Free Democrats ought to strengthen once again their civil rights dimension.
Dan Hough and Michael Koß cover the new entrant at the far left end of the German party spectrum. According to their analysis, the Left Party, which was formed from the postcommunist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and a splinter group of the SPD is, more than anything, a populist party. Based on a critical discussion of this concept, Hough and Koß survey the diversity of currents within the party and their relationship to their main competitors, the Social Democratic Party and the Greens-which, in due course, may well become their closest allies. Finally, Frank Decker and Lazaros Miliopoulos investigate the far Right in the German party system focusing in particular on the right wing extremist National Democratic Party (NPD). At the national level the extremist Right in Germany has never managed to firmly establish itself, and the NPD is currently faced with financial difficulties that may well threaten its very survival as a political party. Yet, the fact that in the NPD stronghold of Saxony voters will be called to the polls in a Land election just four weeks prior to the federal election in September renders their inclusion into this pre-election special issue imperative. Decker and Miliopoulos explore the development of the NPD following the failed attempt in 2003 to outlaw the party, and they discuss the relationship between the protest and the ideological dimensions of right wing extremist voting.
